

THE LACK OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF INDIGENOUS PAPUANS IN THE EMPOWERMENT VORTEX OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY POLICY ALIGNMENTS IN THE PROVINCE OF PAPUA

Ibrahim Kristofol Kendi

Office Administration Programme, Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Cenderawasih University, Jayapura, Papua, Indonesia.
Email: kendikristofol@gmail.com

DOI: [10.5281/zenodo.12741728](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.12741728)

Abstract

This study explores the low political participation of Indigenous Papuans, amidst empowerment and alignment especially on political rights. The main attention is focused on empowerment efforts and policy implementation that should enhance the political rights of Indigenous Papuans. A key concept in this research is the importance of affirmative action to support or strengthen the political rights of marginalized or discriminated groups. The state has an obligation to ensure justice and access to resources and policy decisions that affect the lives of the oppressed. This research applied a descriptive qualitative approach with a case study approach. The data collection approach involved participatory observation, in-depth interviews, and document analysis. The results of this study show that the lack of representation of Alsipapuans in the legislature in the district/city shows that the role of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) is not in line with the mandate of Papua's special autonomy policy. Party political strategies and political elite maneuvers in managing strategic issues are not optimal. Indigenous Papuan political elites do not yet have adequate financial resources while the demands of political financing are quite expensive. The archipelago association movement acts as a channel of power for their group members, limiting indigenous Papuans in utilizing the opportunities mandated by the special autonomy policy. Concrete steps need to be taken to increase the capacity of MRP members in advocating and monitoring special autonomy policies. The importance of identifying and supporting potential cadres from among Indigenous Papuans and evaluating their electability fairly, Indigenous Papuan political elites need to manage crucial issues to gain solid political support. More structured and transparent campaign fund planning can help overcome the financial limitations often faced by Papuan candidates. The role of the archipelago's paguyuban as a channel of power should be closely monitored to ensure they do not abuse political power for their own group interests.

Keywords: Political Participation, Indigenous Papuans, Legislative Institutions, Special Autonomy, Papua.

A. INTRODUCTION

Papua's Special Autonomy policy has been criticized in various ways, including in political recruitment where it has not provided a fair advantage for Indigenous Papuans in some regions. This principle of fairness is stipulated in the special autonomy law, where members are elected in general elections in accordance with applicable regulations, while some are appointed from among Indigenous Papuans. The proportion of DPRP members from Indigenous Papuans is one fourth of the total DPRP members. Political parties at the provincial and district/city levels in Papua are expected to conduct recruitment giving priority to Indigenous Papuans. They may seek input or consultation from the Papuan People's Council (MRP) in their political selection and recruitment processes. The MRP plays an important role in organizing and overseeing this process, which involves two main aspects: recruitment by political parties and recruitment from among Indigenous Papuans.

The political hegemony of non-Papuans can be seen through the number of DPRD members, for example Jayapura Regency, in the 2014 legislative election, out of 25 elected legislators 25% consisted of non-Papuans and 75% of indigenous Papuans, while in the 2019 legislative election, it turned significantly, becoming 78% non-Papuans and 22% indigenous Papuans. Jayapura City, the results of the 2014 legislative election from 40 elected legislators, 45% of whom were non-Papuans and 55% Papuans, in contrast to the 2019 legislative election, non-Papuans rose to 67.50% of 40 elected legislators and 33.50% Papuans. Boven Digoel 19 legislative members in the 2014 legislative election, 31.57% and 68.42% of non-Papuans, the 2019 legislative election of indigenous Papuans 30% and non-Papuans 70%. Merauke Regency in the 2019 legislative election, 90% Non-Papuans and 10% Indigenous Papuans. Kerom Regency 20 DPRD members in the 2019 legislative election results 15% Papuans and 85% Non-Papuans. Sarmi Regency in the 2019 legislative elections, out of 20 elected legislators 65% Non-Papuans and 35% Indigenous Papuans.

There were 45 legislative members elected in the 2014 legislative elections in West Papua Province, 48.88% of whom were Papuans and 51.11% were non-Papuans. The dominance of Non-Papuans in the Regency / City DPRD institutions is not only in several districts in Papua Province, West Papua Province also experienced the same thing. Members of the Sorong Regency DPRD as a result of the 2014 legislative elections, totaling 24 people, 29.16% of whom are Papuans 70.83% are not Papuans. Fakfak Regency in the 2019 legislative election, 40% of the 20 elected legislators consisted of Indigenous Papuans and 60% Non-Papuans. Raja Ampat Regency in the 2014 legislative election elected 20 legislative members 60% Papuans and 40% Non-Papuans, while in the 2019 legislative election turned 55% Non-Papuans and 45% Papuans. Wondama Bay Regency in the 2019 legislative election 44% and 64% Non-Papuans out of 25 elected legislators. Sorong City in the 2014 legislative election, 22.72% Papuans and 77.27% non-Papuans out of 22 elected DPRD members, while in the 2019 legislative election, 20% Papuans and 80% non-Papuans.

The low political participation of indigenous Papuans has caused anxiety for some people, especially indigenous Papuans. Several factors that influence the lack of representation can be seen from several aspects, *first, the* capacity of the MRP in carrying out the mandate of the special autonomy law in driving political alignments towards indigenous Papuans, *second, the* recruitment of political parties based on affirmation policies as stipulated in the special autonomy law policy, *third, the* maneuvering of political elites, especially indigenous Papuans, in order to convince the public, especially their constituents in their respective electoral districts, *fourth, the* level of public trust in the people's representatives in fighting for the social, political, economic and welfare rights of the DPRD, *fifth, adequate* political cost support, indications of power canals that tend to play identity politics.

This research tries to provide ideas and ideas related to *first, the* capacity of the MRP as an institution responsible for protecting the rights of Indigenous Papuans, has the duty and authority to ensure the protection of their rights, with the principle of respecting their customs and culture as the main basis, especially the political rights of Indigenous Papuans amid the special autonomy policy volume II. *Second*, how the strategy of political parties in Papua and West Papua in recruiting party cadres of Indigenous Papuans which has an effect on increasing the electability of the political

parties that carry them. *Third*, maneuvering the Papuan political elite with elegant schemes without harming certain parties with issues of identity politics and the like.

Fourth, increasing the level of public trust through development achievements in the electoral district, *fifth*, political investment effectively and efficiently and *sixth*, monitoring the movement of the archipelago association which tends to act as a canal of power for its group.

B. RESEARCH METHODS

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the MRP's capacity as a cultural representation of Indigenous Papuans, especially regarding their political rights amid the implementation of the special autonomy policy. In addition, this research also aims to explore political parties' strategies in recruiting party cadres from among Indigenous Papuans that have an impact on increasing the electability of the party, as well as the tactics of Indigenous Papuan political elites who do not use identity politics issues. Other efforts investigated are increasing public trust through development in electoral districts, political investment, and approaches to the archipelago's paguyuban movement that acts as a channel of power for the group.

The data sources of this research include MRP members, heads and secretaries of political parties, legislative candidates of Indigenous Papuans, constituents, and the head of the archipelago association. Data were collected through non-participant observation techniques and relevant or important information related to the research problem.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Political Affirmation

Political affirmation is a concept that emphasizes the importance of affirmative action or actions aimed at restoring, supporting, or strengthening the political, economic, or social rights of marginalized or discriminated groups. The concept is often used in the context of racial, gender or social class discrimination.

One theory that supports political affirmation is social justice theory. This theory argues that the state has a responsibility to ensure that individuals have a fair opportunity to succeed. Rawls, J. (1971) and Young, (1990). Kabeer, N. (2005). Batliwala, S. (2007) relates political affirmation to empowerment in that individuals or groups are enabled to be empowered when they gain access to and control over resources, decisions and policies that affect their lives. In addition, political affirmation theory can also be seen through the lens of critical theory. Freire, P. (1970). Hooks, b. (1984) emphasizes the importance of identifying and challenging oppressive power structures that exist in society. In the context of political affirmation, critical theory highlights the need for radical action to change systems that produce inequality. Ayoob (1978) argues that political affirmation can play a role in the process of political integration, strengthen the ethnic or cultural identity of a group, contribute to the formation of a more inclusive and stable state and society and play a role in defusing inter-ethnic or inter-group conflicts. While Chandra and Kanchan (2004) provide a view of the political dynamics in India with the presence of ethnic parties becoming a significant political force in the country.

Varshney's (2002) notion of political affirmation theory in understanding ethnic conflict and political dynamics in India provides important insights into how ethnic and religious identities can be used in a political context to mobilize support and gain political advantage. The same thing is expressed by Horowitz, (1985), that political affirmation is linked to identity mobilization, how political groups and leaders use ethnic identity to mobilize political support from their group members. This strategy can include political rhetoric that emphasizes ethnic loyalty and strengthens feelings of solidarity in the face of conflict with other groups, political polarization between ethnic groups can occur as a result of political competition that emphasizes differences and conflicts, not similarities or reconciliation, slowing integration, namely strong political affirmation from certain ethnic groups can slow down the process of national integration or the formation of an inclusive national identity and political elites can take advantage of political affirmation to maintain power or gain political advantage from inter-ethnic conflict and also inter-ethnic reconciliation efforts to overcome conflict and build peace.

In the Indonesian context, the affirmation policy was born from asymmetrical decentralization, Huda (2014: 61) states that asymmetrical decentralization is the granting of special authority to areas that have certain diversity. The term asymmetrical decentralization is often equated with the concept of autonomy applied in countries facing the challenge of separatism, as happened in Indonesia. Countries that experience separatism are based on ethnopolitical movements. Kaputra et al (2013: 174-175) introduce ethnopolitical movements in Indonesia, First: ethnopolitical movements with ethnonation at heart, Second: ethnopolitical movements that fight for ethnic rights to obtain autonomy rights. Ethnopolitics with an ethnonation spirit is a political movement that leads to demands to separate into an independent and sovereign state, for example the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Aceh, *Atcheh Sumatra National Liberation* (ASNLF), Free Papua Organization (OPM) in Papua, Free Riau Movement in Riau Province, (Kaputra et al: 175). Experts divide the goals of this ethnopolitical movement into six goals: 1 obtaining recognition in ethnic political rights, 2. Obtaining autonomy, 3. Changing the territorial boundaries of ethnic groups, 4. Obtaining the right of *self-determination*, 5. Obtaining independence, 6. Meraika sovereignty (Tambunan in Kaputra et al: 2013: 175).

In the case of Papua, ethnopolitics with an ethnonation spirit is the result of years of public policy centralization followed by a repressive approach not only to resolve conflicts but in all aspects of life, verbal violence, marginalization, economic inequality limited access to education are repressive actions with a *soft* approach so that the right to ethnic Papuan autonomy is not fought for by indigenous Papuans, but is offered and tends to be forced, this is evidenced by the rejection of the community through demonstrations since the special autonomy policy volume 1. In cases like this, something that is not asked for and tends to be imposed usually does not succeed, but instead causes prolonged conflict. Affirmation policies in the context of governance can be viewed from two sides and are dichotomous. Affirmation from the positive side is a government effort to create independence and dignity, because independence is the basis of the honor and dignity of the nation (Sasono: 2013: 11). On the other hand, affirmation policies are utilized as a moment to create social, economic, political independence and provide infrastructure that brings investment to the regions. Meanwhile, from a negative point of view, the affirmation policy is a discretion that if misused will create dependence which ultimately creates poverty.

2. Capacity of Affirmation Institution

Jimly Asshiddiqie's opinion (Isra 2020: 9) states that there are state institutions formed based on the Constitution and some are formed and get a mandate from the law (UU) hierarchy or ranking of positions depending on the degree of regulation according to applicable regulations. According to Shapiro, Ian. (2013) and Anderson, Elizabeth (2017) academic and research institutions have a role in developing arguments and analysis that support affirmative policies. These institutions build an understanding of the importance of affirmative policies in the social and political context.

Meanwhile Wampler, Brian. (2018) and Cornwall, eds all (2007) state that Non-Governmental Organizations or civil society and advocacy organizations act as a voice for groups that benefit from affirmative policies. This is done through raising public support, providing legal assistance, and encouraging the implementation of affirmative policies at various levels of government.

3. Political Institutions

a. Political Party

Carl J. Friedrich (1963) explains that a political party is a stable structured group of people, with the aim of maintaining or taking over control of the government for the benefit of its members, both in terms of ideology and practical benefits. Political parties function as a tool to recruit cadres who aim to prepare and select them for the interests of local and national leaders. The quality of cadres is very important for political parties to determine their own leaders and get the opportunity to offer candidates on the national political stage.

Political parties play a role in managing conflict by consolidating and articulating the various demands of different groups in society (Budiarjdo 2008: 409). In a heterogeneous society like this, political parties play a role in coordinating these various interests into a common agenda. Technically, strengthening the capacity of political party cadres is focused on effective political communication strategies, whether through oral communication, writing, or using symbols or communication props.

b. Capacity of Parliamentary Institutions

Young, (2000) promotes the Theory of Political Inclusion, where parliamentary institutions champion marginalized groups not only formal participation in the political process, but also attention to access to power, influence, and justice, in addition to emphasizing the importance of public dialogue and participation in political decision-making through the concept of deliberative democracy and political systems reformed to be more responsive to social plurality and diverse needs.

Another concept put forward is Traditional Representative Democracy which explores the limited participation of the people so that more space is given in the democratic process, there is also the concept of Social Inclusion and Justice which links political inclusion including access to resources, opportunities, and economic justice as a tool to fight for equality and justice throughout society.

Sisk (2005) explores the difficulties in forming strong social agreements among various ethnic, political and social groups in South Africa. Krook, M. L. (2010) argues that the quality of parliamentarians is determined through policies made by

parliamentary institutions that can affect the protection and improvement of conditions for marginalized groups. Parliament in various contexts affects the lives and rights of marginalized groups, (Skocpol, T. (1992) and Gaviria, A., & Pages, C. (Eds.). (2002). How political participation of marginalized groups can be facilitated or influenced by the efforts of parliamentary institutions, Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995).

4. Capacity of Local Political Elite

Political elites in the regions must be able to make concrete efforts in building public trust in themselves, especially in their electoral areas. Political maneuvering is nothing but the ability to influence constituents without sacrificing parties including political opponents. The strategy is to do what political opponents do not do or take advantage of their weaknesses without sacrificing them.

The foundation for understanding how the capacity of parliamentarians can be defined, measured, and enhanced in the context of various political and public administration theories also includes empirical case studies that demonstrate the application of these theories in real situations in various countries and political systems.

Norris, P. (2001) states how parliamentarians can responsively represent the interests and preferences of their constituents by listening, understanding, and responding to the aspirations of the people they represent.

Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2000) argue that the capacity of parliamentarians to process information and policy analysis effectively is very important in carrying out legislative and oversight functions.

Marsh, D., & Smith, M. (2000) consider how parliamentarians learn from their experiences and interactions with various stakeholders, and how the knowledge gained influences their decisions and actions. Mansbridge, J. (2003), highlights the capacity of parliamentarians to participate in discussions and deliberative processes in making decisions that affect society.

Powell Jr., G. B. (2000) measures and evaluates the capacity of parliamentarians based on their performance in producing effective legislation, as well as in conducting oversight of government policies.

5. Political Costs

Political campaign costs, including their impact on democracy, representation and political finance regulation of political campaign costs are important in the context of efforts to ensure transparency, integrity and fair access in the political process and how politicians meet these demands. According to Corrado (2019) the cost of political campaigns continues to rise due to the increasing complexity of technology used in modern campaigns.

He highlighted that these costs include not only political advertising in mass media but also digital costs that are increasingly dominant in campaign strategies. Mann and Ornstein (2016) argue that high campaign costs can lead to candidates' dependence on large donors or special interest groups, which can influence the policies adopted by elected officials.

Lawrence Lessig (2011) highlights the impact of "big money" in US politics and how large expenditures on political campaigns can limit the access and representation of the general public in the political process. Alvarez and Hall discuss campaign costs and the strategies used to raise campaign funds, as well as their impact on democratization processes and political representation. Hasen (2019) explores in his work campaign finance and efforts to regulate the influence of money in politics, including the emerging legal challenges associated with such regulation.

6. Community Society

Putnam (2000) discusses the importance of participation and engagement in society to support social solidarity and collective well-being. Warren (2001) presents theory and research on the relationship between community participation and the health of democracy. Fung, A., & Wright, E. O. (Eds.). (2003) Discusses various forms of innovation in collective decision-making and responsiveness to community demands. Fishkin, J. S. (2009). Discusses the importance of public deliberation in strengthening public participation in the political process.

Community manoeuvres in practical politics are carried out through the activity of forming strong networks and social networks to form alliances with other groups that have similar goals through involvement in local politics, civil society cooperation, they can work together with civil society organizations, become advocacy groups, or special interest groups to fight for common interests.

Participate in political decision-making processes, whether through participation in elections, community forums, or local committees. In addition, advocacy and social campaigns are often used to advocate for social, economic or environmental issues that are important to their communities.

They may organize campaigns to change public policy or to improve living conditions in their communities. Communities can identify and support local leaders who represent their community's values and interests within the broader political structure.


This can include supporting local candidates who are committed to representing and fighting for the aspirations of the community through the use of online platforms to organize petitions, campaigns, or to disseminate information and opinions on important issues.

D. DISCUSSION RESULTS

The political affirmation policy for indigenous Papuans regulates the recruitment of political party members at the provincial, district and city levels, prioritizing indigenous Papuans. The Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) has a role in providing consideration and making selections based on the eligibility of indigenous Papuan identity, taking into account anthropological aspects. The facts related to the political affirmation of indigenous Papuans in the context of local politics in the Land of Papua are explained as follows:

1. Representation of Indigenous Papuans in the Papuan Provincial Legislature

The legislative members of Papua Province as a result of the 2019 legislative elections for the 2019/2024 period of service are 50 DPRD members, namely 39 Papuan members or 78% and 11 non-Papuan members or 22% can be seen in the diagram below.




<https://dpr-papua.go.id/55-anggota-dpr-papua-hasil-pemilu-2019-resmi-dilantik/> (processed)

Members of the DPRD of indigenous Papuans in the legislature that political parties at the provincial level still accommodate the political rights of indigenous Papuans in order to fight for the aspirations of the community as a whole. The strategies and maneuvers of political elites are quite influential, especially on their constituents, followed by the human resource capacity of legislative members and adequate political costs.

2. Participation of indigenous Papuans in the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) at the district/city level in Papua Province

The diagram below shows the representation of indigenous Papuans in legislative bodies in districts/cities in Papua Province.



Source : <https://dpr-papua.go.id/keterwakilan-oap-di-dprd-se-papua-sangat-minim/> (processed)

The data above shows that indigenous Papuan legislators at the district and city levels have hardly broken the 50% mark in the last 10 years. 158 legislative members spread across six regions, 72.78% are not indigenous Papuans, the remaining 27.22% are inhabited by landowners (sons of the region). By looking at this unbalanced percentage of representation, it can be concluded that the aspirations of indigenous Papuans are certainly not channeled due to their limited representation in the DPRD.

3. Political Affirmation of OAP through the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP)

The Perdasus on the authority of the MRP does not specifically and clearly regulate the political rights of indigenous Papuans in the legislative and executive institutions, especially in districts/cities. In addition, governors and deputy governors are required to consider customary criteria related to the status of indigenous Papuans.

Affirmation of regulations that provide legal power to take advocacy steps has not been fully addressed by the MRP. In the legal aspect, the MRP has not affirmed the regulations governing political affirmation for indigenous Papuans and in its implementation to determine whether there is any discrepancy or misuse. In addition, there has been no public campaign to voice concerns, and mobilize public support to challenge the political affirmation of indigenous Papuans based on the minimal representation of indigenous Papuans in the legislature.

The authority to provide recommendations to political parties to pay attention to the representation of indigenous Papuans in the management and nomination of legislative members has not been used as a legal framework for making complaints and reports to the government regarding political parties' non-compliance with political affirmation rules to the KPU and Bawaslu in accordance with applicable regulations. There has been no dialog and negotiation with other stakeholders to find mutually acceptable solutions related to the implementation of political affirmation for indigenous Papuans. The legal approach has not yet taken legal channels to sue or file cases related to the implementation of political affirmation with the court or other dispute resolution institutions. The purpose of challenging the political affirmation of indigenous Papuans through the Papuan MRP can vary, ranging from fighting for increased protection and empowerment of indigenous Papuans to ensuring that existing affirmative policies truly meet their needs and rights.

4. Political Institutions

Political parties in Papua have not carried out political affirmation for indigenous Papuans by referring to the provisions in the Papua Perdasus. This is in line with the party's internal policy that the competence of the figure is the thing that determines electability, so affirmation does not have to be a priority, besides the ability of resources to fund candidacy in the political process is the responsibility of election participants. This is what results in political parties in Papua not being able to make the political affirmation of indigenous Papuans based on the Papua Perdasus as their political platform and not being committed to advocating for the mainstreaming of the rights of indigenous Papuans in political participation. Political parties in Papua have not formulated policies and programs that support the recognition and protection of the political rights of indigenous Papuans, including support for the implementation of the Perdasus Papua policy. The small number of indigenous Papuan legislators shows that political parties have not fought for the formation of local regulations at the district/city level that consider the aspirations and needs of

indigenous Papuans. In terms of raising public support and solidarity, political parties have not used their political platforms aimed at educating and mobilizing public support for issues that are relevant to what must be achieved, so that awareness and solidarity among the Papuan people are not well established. The promotion of political education and leadership of indigenous Papuans in political parties is minimal due to the lack of training and political education for indigenous Papuans to strengthen their capacity to actively participate in political and governance processes.

5. Political Elite Maneuvering

Political maneuvering is a strategy employed to achieve political goals. It includes a variety of tactics and strategies used in a political context to influence public opinion, win electoral support or influence political decisions. The cause of the lack of electoral support is a campaign that is less intensive and has not been focused. Legislative candidates in the districts are less active in conducting well-organized and focused campaigns to build awareness and gain support from voters. The campaigns that are carried out are inactive and less effective and not well structured, so they do not reach potential voters.

The lack of frequency of legislative candidates' presence in the electoral districts to understand the issues that are important to constituents is the cause of the lack of political support. Legislative candidates lack clear and transparent communication of their vision, mission and programs. Candidates also do not effectively communicate their ideas or provide adequate explanation of their plans if elected, voters may feel hesitant to provide support. Local issues are not well-channeled, candidates have not been able to identify and convey these issues clearly and relevantly to the needs of their constituents. Voters feel that their candidates fail to articulate or ignore local issues, because they do not understand or care about the problems they face.

Lack of Involvement in the Community, legislative candidates not actively involved in community activities or social organizations may not get strong support from their constituents. Active involvement can help build a positive image of the candidate as a leader who cares and is committed to the community. Legislative candidates are less knowledgeable about important issues and policies relevant to their constituents. Local governments in Papua Province are faced with serious human resource problems, with the overall illiterate population in Papua Province reaching 20.38% before the division of the new autonomous region. Some of the regions recorded in this study are fairly low in illiteracy based on statistical data, Jayapura City 0.41%, Jayapura Regency 1.21%, Merauke 1.70%, Sarmi 1.25% while two other regions need serious attention, namely Kerom 7.03% and Boven Digoel 3.64%. But other social issues such as inequality of population income, Merauke Regency 17.21 percent of the population has low income, Boven Digoel 14.45%, Kerom 17.67%, Jayapura City 20.61%, Jayapura Regency 17.36%. Open unemployment in Merauke Regency is 2.19%, Jayapura City 11.67%, Boven Digoel 6.73% and Sarmi 3.50%. Indigenous Papuan legislative candidates have not been able to understand this issue and make it a strategic issue to achieve political goals.

6. Capacity of District Council Members

The extent to which community interests are embodied in a policy or development program. This capacity consists of human resource capacity and political lobbying in parliament. Human resource capacity is measured by the extent to which DPRD members carry out their constitutional functions of oversight, legislation and

budgeting. Supervision relates to the implementation of local regulations and the like by the executive, legislation relates to establishing local regulations and budgeting relates to approving the APBD proposed by the executive which is then stipulated in local regulations.

To assess the extent to which DPRD members have succeeded in carrying out their duties and functions, it can be seen through whether the aspirations of the community have been converted into local regulations, whether the development programs implemented have really touched the right target groups. In this case, is the source of funding for special autonomy funds really intended for indigenous Papuans or is it misdirected, and to what extent does the synergy between the DPRD and MRP oversee a number of Perdasus that have been implemented? Until now, the issue of customary rights has not been resolved, a number of customary land conflicts involving the government and customary rights owners have not been resolved, data collection of indigenous Papuans to determine the number of indigenous people has no legal basis, (regional regulations or the like), financing of special autonomy funds has not been right on target because it is still simultaneous because non-Papuan interests are still accommodated in financing special autonomy funds, the MPR and DPRD have not synergized in making permanent a regulation related to the political rights of indigenous Papuans at the district level. A number of these issues have not been a concern for legislators, especially indigenous Papuans, so that the capacity of parliaments in the regions has not been able to unravel the problems that have occurred so far.

7. Political Costs

One of the factors inhibiting the lack of participation of Indigenous Papuans in the nomination or as legislative candidates, especially in the districts/cities covered in this study, is the lack of political costs borne by election participants which include advertising and promotion costs, campaign staff costs, research and *polling* costs, transportation and travel costs, legal and compliance costs, database maintenance and information technology costs and other costs needed according to conditions in the field. Legislative candidates are not given financial support from the political parties they represent, in addition legislative candidates do not seek donations from individuals, groups, or organizations that support or have an interest in their platforms or programs, have not been able to hold fundraising events such as charity events, meetings with supporters, or online fundraising campaigns to raise campaign funds, have not effectively used social media platforms, to disseminate campaign messages and solicit donations from supporters and sympathizers directly, have not built direct support from the public by actively interacting, listening to feedback, and strengthening relationships with potential voters and have not properly integrated campaign strategies, including the use of traditional and digital media, to achieve greater visibility and build connections with more supporters.

8. Community Society Involvement

Community groups from various communities across the archipelago are participating in the political arena in Papua. These groups have political motivations to fight for their aspirations. Judging from the dominance of non-Papuan votes in the DPRD, especially in Jayapura City, it appears that these community groups are active in designing power to realize their political interests. In addition to being involved in the nomination of legislative members, these groups also participate in influencing public

opinion and recommending candidates, especially vice-regent candidates from their group. Association groups from outside Papua do not have the authority to propose candidates from their own group, however, to ensure their interests are well protected, political decisions to support candidates for governor and deputy governor remain a major concern for groups such as the Papua Province Toraja Family Association (IKT) giving support to Paulus Waterpauw in the Papua Governor Election for the period 2024-2029. (<https://seputarpapua.com/view/paulus-waterpauw-pilihan-ikt-jadi-gubernur-papua.html>).

On the other hand, the South Sulawesi Family Association (KKSS) of Papua Province, does not play an active role in practical politics in the Land of Papua, the South Sulawesi community is committed not to interfere in political affairs with the existence of this community organization as a whole but does not prohibit members from being involved in practical politics, because it is a democratic right guaranteed in the law and even the Indonesian state constitution. The importance of distinguishing between local organizational containers and political organizations such as political parties. The KKSS should not be used as an arena for practical politics. KKSS is not involved in practical politics. (<https://republiknews.co.id/rajut-persaudaraan-warga-kkss-papua-selatan-gelar-attudang-sipulung-dan-doa-bersama-lintas-agama/>).

E. CLOSING

1. Conclusion

The limited political participation in the election of legislative members in Papua Province indicates that the role of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as a cultural representation of indigenous Papuans with the responsibility to protect their rights, with the principle of respecting customs and culture, especially political rights in the context of implementing the special autonomy policy is not running or in other words the MRP has not carried out the mandate of the special autonomy law. Political parties do not prioritize indigenous Papuans in the nomination of legislative members because they prioritize figures that have an impact on the electability of the party. The efforts of Papuan political elites in managing strategic issues such as high illiteracy rates, significant family income inequality, high open unemployment rates are not managed as sexy issues in garnering adequate political support as well as a means of increasing public trust, especially in their respective electoral areas. Political investment is not efficient and effective. Financial support is a very dominant factor in limiting indigenous Papuans in political participation. Candidates' sources of financing come from personal finances so they are limited while the needs of campaigns, advertising, research, publication costs of staff, campaign officers and others are quite increasing. The role of the archipelago association is to act as a channel of power for their group members.

2. Advice

- a. *Strengthening the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP)*: It is important to strengthen the role of the MRP as a cultural representation institution to be more active in safeguarding the political and cultural rights of Indigenous Papuans in accordance with the mandate of the special autonomy law. Concrete steps such as increasing the capacity of MRP members in advocating and monitoring special autonomy policies need to be strengthened.

- b. *Prioritizing Indigenous Papuans in Political Candidacies*: Political parties need to prioritize the involvement and candidacy of Indigenous Papuans in legislative elections. This can be done by identifying and supporting potential cadres from among Indigenous Papuans and measuring their electability fairly.
- c. *Strategic Management of Key Issues*: Indigenous Papuan political elites should manage crucial issues such as education, economic inequality, and unemployment as the main focus in gaining strong political support. This can not only increase public trust but also strengthen their political position in the electoral region.
- d. *Efficient and Effective Political Investment*: It is important to ensure that political investments are made efficiently and effectively. More structured and transparent campaign fund planning can help overcome the financial limitations often experienced by Indigenous Papuan candidates.
- e. *Empowerment and Accountability of Community Organizations*: The role of nusantara associations as channels of power needs to be closely monitored to ensure that they do not exploit political power for their own group interests.

References

- 1) Anderson, Elizabeth. 2017. *Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don't Talk about It)*. Princeton University Press.
- 2) Ayoob, Mohammed. 1978, "Political Affirmation and Integration." *World Politics*, vol. 30, no.4, pp. 579-593.
- 3) Alvarez, R. Michael, et al. 2012, *Nonprofit Organizations and Democracy in the United States*. Routledge.
- 4) Budiardjo Miriam, 2008, *Basics of Political Science*, Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta. Batliwala, S. (2007). Taking the power out of empowerment: An experiential account. *Development in Practice*, 17 (4-5), 557-565.
- 5) Cornwall, Andrea, Elizabeth Harrison, and Ann Whitehead, eds. 2007. *Feminisms in Development: Contradictions, Contestations and Challenges*. Zed Books.
- 6) Corrado, A. (2019). Campaign finance and digital advertising in the United States. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 18 (3), 245-260.
- 7) Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- 8) Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2000). *The new public service: Serving, not steering*. M.E. Sharpe.
- 10) Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York, NY: Continuum.
- 11) Friedrich, Carl J. 1963. *Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- 12) Friedrich, Carl J. 1968. *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- 13) George Emma, Mackean Tamara, Fisher Matt, Baum Fran, Analysing the Inconsistent Recognition of Indigenous Rights in Early Childhood Policy Documents from the Australian Government's "Closing the Gap" Strategy Between 2008-2018, *The International Indigenous Policy Journal*, Volume 14, Issue 3, December 2023, page 1-26.
- 14) Hasen, R. L. (2019). Polarization and democratic dysfunction. *Indiana Law Journal*, 94(1), 1- 27.
- 15) Hooks, b. (1984). *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. The University of California Press.

- 16) Huda Ni'Matul, 2014, *Asymmetric Decentralization in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia: A Study of Special Regions, Special Regions and Special Autonomy*, Nusa Media Bandung.
- 17) Internet, "Many OAP candidates fail, Marind community builds tents at Merauke DPRD", accessed June 12 at 23:00, at <https://arsip.jubi.id/banyak-caleg-oap-gagal-masyarakat-marind-bangun-tenda-di-dprd-merauke/>.
- 18) Internet, "Papua Regional House of Representatives 2014-2017 Term of Service" [https://Papua.Go.Id/Files/Instansi/160/PROFIL%20DPRP%20PAPUA%20MASA%20BHAKTI%202014%20-2019%20\(PAKAI\).Pdf](https://Papua.Go.Id/Files/Instansi/160/PROFIL%20DPRP%20PAPUA%20MASA%20BHAKTI%202014%20-2019%20(PAKAI).Pdf).
- 19) Internet, "OAP Representation in DPRDs throughout Papua is Very Minimal. <https://dpr-papua.go.id/keterwakilan-oap-di-dprd-se-papua-sangat-minim/>.
- 20) Internet, Officially Inaugurated, These are the 20 Members of the Keerom Regency DPRD for the 2019-2024 Period, <https://www.lintaspapua.com/politik/pr-6554369911/resmi-dilantik-inilah-20-anggota-dprd-kabupaten-keerom-periode-2019-2024>
- 21) Internet, Data of Elected Candidates of West Papua Provincial DPRD Members 2014 - 2019 Data https://Www.Kpu.Go.Id/Koleksigambar/Province_Papua_Barat_Terpilih.Pdf
- 22) Internet, *Paulus Waterpauw Selected by Toraja Family Association to be Governor of Papua*, accessed June 28, 2024 at (<https://seputarpapua.com/view/paulus-waterpauw-pilihan-ikt-jadi-gubernur-papua.html>).
- 23) Internet, Rajut Persaudaraan, Warga KKSS Papua Selatan Gelar 'Attudang Sipulung' dan Doa Bersama Lintas Agama, accessed on June 23, 2024 at https://republiknews.co.id/rajut-persaudaraan-warga-kkss-papua-selatan-gelar-attudang-sipulung-dan-doa-bersama-lintas-agama/#google_vignette
- 24) Isra Sadil, 2022, *State Institutions: Concept, History, Authority, and Constitutional Dynamics*, Rajawali Pers, Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta.
- 25) Jamal, Ode, and Yan Dirk Wabiser. "Controversy over the Realization of Affirmative Seats for Legislative Members in Papua Special Autonomy." *LIPI-Magazine of Indonesian Social Sciences* 45, no. 2 (n.d.): 185-193.
- 26) Kabeer, N. (2005). *Gender equality and women's empowerment: A critical analysis of the third Millennium Development Goal*. *Gender & Development*, 13 (1), 13-24.
- 27) Kaputra Iswan et al, 2013, *The Impact of Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Piecing together the History of Politics and Governance in Indonesia*, Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia, Jakarta.
- 28) Krook, M. L. (2010). *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. Oxford University Press.
- 29) Lessig, Lawrence. 2011, *Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress-and a Plan to Stop It*. Twelve.
- 30) Mann, T. E., & Ornstein, N. J. (2016). *It's even worse than it looks: How the American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism* (3rd ed.)-Basic Books.
- 31) Marsh, D., & Smith, M. (2000). *Understanding policy networks: Towards a dialectical approach*. Sage Publications.
- 32) Mansbridge, J. (2003). Rethinking representation. *American Political Science Review*, 97(4), 515-528. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000921>.
- 33) Meleakhi Samuel Pasalli, "Political Affirmation Policy of Indigenous Papuans in the Regional Representative Council in Papua, *Journal of Law Politics and Power*, No. 1 Vol. 4, pp. 56-70.
- 34) Neuman, Sigmund. 1956. *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 35) Norris, P. (2001). *Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.

- 36) Powell Jr., G. B. (2000). *Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions*. Yale University Press.
- 37) Regional Regulation of Papua Province, Number 6 of 2020, concerning the Protection and Development of Local Food.
- 38) Special Regional Regulation of Papua Province No. 23/2008 on the Ulayat Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Individual Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Land.
- 39) Special Regional Regulation of Papua Province Number 3 of 2013 on Education Services for Remote Indigenous Communities.
- 40) Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- 41) Sasono Adi, 2013, *Being a Master in Your Own Country: The Struggle for Democracy, Dignity, and Independence*, Grafindo Books Media, Jakarta.
- 42) Saifiudin, Saufiudina, Political Law of Appointment of Indigenous Papuans in the Regional Representative Body in Papua, *Journal of Poros Hukum Universitas Padjajaran Bandung*, P-ISSN: 2715-7202, E-ISSN: 2715-9416, pp. 128-148.
- 43) Shapiro, Ian. 2013. *The State of Democratic Theory*. Princeton University Press.
- 44) Sisk, T. D. (2005). *Democratization in South Africa: The elusive social contract*. Princeton University Press.
- 45) Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Yale University Press.
- 46) Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.
- 47) Wampler, Brian. 2018. *Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking Institutions*. University of Notre Dame Press.
- 48) Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 49) Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford University Press.